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CHAPTER 7
The Long Carry: Landscapes  
and the Shaping of British Medical 
Masculinities in the First World War
Jessica Meyer
5–7 October 1915 was a busy period for Frank Ridsdale, a private in the 
89th Field Ambulance RAMC(T), serving on the Gallipoli peninsula. 
Having spent the night of 5 October at an advanced aid post dressing 
men’s wounds, he came down for breakfast at the dressing station the 
following morning before spending the rest of the day flattening roads 
for ambulance waggons. The next day saw him moving between the 
Main Dressing Station, the Base, where he was sent to collect supplies, 
and finally the advanced aid post, where he spent the afternoon attend-
ing again to the wounded under shrapnel fire.1
The variety of work that Ridsdale undertook over a two-day period 
was hardly uncommon for a Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) ranker, 
particularly in the midst of a campaign such as the Gallipoli invasion. 
What is notable throughout the nine volumes of diaries he wrote cover-
ing his service from August 1915 through to the spring of 1919, how-
ever, is the range of ways in which the varying landscapes he served in 
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shaped the work he undertook. On the peninsula, he was both manip-
ulating the landscape through his road levelling, and negotiating it as 
he moved between base, dressing station and aid post. Later he would 
find himself similarly occupied in France and Flanders, digging drains to 
enable a hospital to which he was posted to withstand the rain, and car-
rying wounded men from aid post to dressing station over periods last-
ing up to 20 hours.2 In both settings, the landscape defined the rigours 
and challenges of the work undertaken, from the hills on the peninsula, 
which dictated the location of the base and its distance from the dressing 
station, to the damaged French landscape which caused Ridsdale to get 
lost while evacuating the wounded.3
The lives of all soldiers in the First World War were shaped, to a 
greater or lesser extent, by the landscapes in which they served. From 
staff officers planning strategy to the infantryman living a troglodyte 
existence in trenches, landscapes were an inherent part of wartime life. 
The relationship with the landscape varied, however, not only by rank 
and sector,4 but also by branch of service. The perspective of a cavalry-
man on the obstacles and opportunities presented by the landscape was 
fundamentally different from that of a tank driver, while a pilot’s map 
of a landscape from the air would be entirely unlike that of a Sapper 
working in tunnels beneath the earth. It was not only artillery that, as 
Rudyard Kipling noted, moved ‘by the leave o’ the ground’.5 All military 
units did, but all did so in significantly different ways.
This chapter explores the particular relationship to the landscape 
of the RAMC. Their role within the military was unique in a  number 
of ways. In the first place, they were, under the terms of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1864 and 1906, a neutral unit who were only allowed 
to carry arms in self-defence.6 Their status within the British armed ser-
vices, therefore, was that of a non-combatant unit. This status had impor-
tant implications for how RAMC servicemen were perceived by their 
combatant comrades, many of whom viewed them, at least initially, as 
‘poultice wallahs’. As George Swindell recalled, the disparaging epithet 
‘Rob All My Comrades’ was in common use by combatant rankers in the 
early days of his service.7 The work of men whose primary purpose was 
to save lives and bodies rather than kill or damage them was dismissed as 
unsoldierly further up the chain of command, which viewed the young 
Corps (formally established in 1898) as not being properly part of the 
 military.8 If, as has been noted by a number of gender historians, the sol-
dier formed the hegemonic masculine ideal in wartime British society,9 the 
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experiences of men like Swindell point to the important qualification that 
it was combatant servicemen who this society deemed to have achieved 
dominant masculinity. Despite wearing a uniform and serving under 
military discipline, the masculinity of the RAMC serviceman was under 
threat throughout the war from perceptions of physical frailty and associ-
ations with the deviant masculinity of the conscientious objector.10 This 
perception of the fragility of RAMC masculinity had important implica-
tions for the ways in which men in the Corps constructed and represented 
their engagement with different types of landscape.
The relationship of these men to the battlefield was not only unique 
because they operated in it unarmed, however. Significantly their duties 
on it also had a dual purpose in military terms. The medical services were 
required to provide both care, in order to ensure the appropriate treat-
ment of men who might return to health, and therefore active service, 
if treated promptly, and swift evacuation, removing the wounded from 
a space where they might become obstacles to the actions of the com-
batant units. This dual role of evacuation and care provision meant that 
the unit’s work revolved around both movement and stasis—the former 
in the evacuation process, the latter to aid caregiving and the recovery 
of health and fitness. Both these priorities shaped the relationships of 
RAMC servicemen with the landscape, requiring them to interact with 
it in two key ways, through manipulation and negotiation. This chapter 
considers each of these forms of interaction within the context of two 
different landscapes, the Western Front and the Egyptian desert. Using 
the memoirs and diaries of RAMC servicemen, it examines how 
 descriptions of landscape and, the work undertaken within it, were used 
by these men to construct definitions of medical service which empha-
sised the physical and emotional labour of their roles. This, in turn, ena-
bled these men to lay claim to a particular subjective space within the 
landscapes of war, one in which they were comrades in service rather 
than ‘slackers in khaki’.
ThE LinE of EvacuaTion
To understand how landscapes shaped the work and identities of RAMC 
servicemen, it is necessary to examine the logistical and strategic place 
they occupied. The work of these men took place primarily along the 
lines of communication which formed part of the chain of evacuation 
from No Man’s Land to hospital.11 This stretched across three zones, the 
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collecting zone, occupied by the field units, the evacuation zone, cor-
responding with the Line of Communication (LoC), and the distribu-
tion zone, comprising the Base area, Home hospitals and convalescence 
(Fig. 7.1).
Fig. 7.1 Diagram of the organisation of medical services, W. G. Macpherson, 
History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: Medical Services General 
History, Vol. 2 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1921), 17
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The Royal Army Medical Corps Training manual (1911), which served 
as the basis for training both officers and men of the Corps, acknowl-
edged the fundamental nature of the relationship between the specialised 
work of the Army Medical Service (AMS) and the landscape in which 
they served. For example, specific considerations for the placement of 
each post along the line of evacuation were laid out in some detail. In 
the collecting zone, the Regimental Aid Posts (RAPs), the purview of 
the Regimental Medical Officer (RMO), were the first point of call for 
wounded men. Here they received the first medical assessment of their 
wound which was then classified and redressed.12 The position of RAPs 
was decided by the RMO in consultation with the regimental, battalion 
or divisional commanding officer. It was to be placed ‘as far forwards as 
consistent with reasonable safety. The range of rifle and shellfire and the 
configuration of the country must be carefully considered’.13 Proximity 
to artillery positions was to be avoided to minimise the chance of the post 
being hit by enemy fire, although in reality this was nearly impossible as 
the geography which made a site suitable for an aid post was very simi-
lar to that which made it a suitable gun emplacement. Low-lying ground 
was deemed most suitable as it avoided men having to be carried uphill, 
and water was often more easily available. Woods were to be avoided 
as they made dressing stations more difficult for bearers and the walk-
ing wounded to find. Nearby water and supplies of straw or grass for the 
wounded to lie on were desirable, as was a location readily accessible to 
wheeled vehicles. Ideally, RAPs and dressing stations, the next stop along 
the evacuation route for wounded men, would be located ‘in suitable 
buildings. Such buildings should be easy of access; clean or capable of 
being readily cleaned and prepared for the reception of wounded; pos-
sess means of ventilation, and if possible, of lighting, warming, and cook-
ing. Suitability for ready expansion of the dressing station is important’.14 
Thus, the landscape was called upon to provide protection,  accessibility, 
necessities for the provision of care and the potential for modification as 
the need arose. In reality, of course, many of these requirements were 
impossible to meet. RAPs were often little more than dugouts in the 
front line of trenches, while dressing stations were often exposed, with 
little access to either necessities of care or space for expansion.
Clearing Hospitals, or Casualty Clearing Stations (CCSs) as they 
became known after 1915, were the next stage along the line of evac-
uation. As the pivot ‘upon which the removal of the sick and wounded 
turns’,15 these were far larger establishments, requiring accommodation in 
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suitable buildings or in tents with a minimum camping space of 240 yards 
by 190 yards to accommodate 200 sick and wounded. As with dressing 
stations, ‘the area must permit of great expansion, as a clearing hospital 
may be required to take in many more sick and wounded’.16 CCSs were 
their own established unit within the RAMC and had always been more 
static than the dressing stations, set up and run by the tent subdivisions 
of Field Ambulances. In the early years of the war, they rapidly evolved, as 
noted by Mark Harrison, into ‘semi-permanent fixtures’. From October 
1914, ‘CCSs gained bedsteads, trained nurses, more surgical equipment, 
and specialist surgeons. By the end of the year there were eight such 
units [increased from the original six sent out in August] doing relatively 
advanced surgical work at the front’.17 By 1915, units could accommodate 
between 500 and 1,000 patients and their staff consisted of seven medical 
officers, a quartermaster, a dentist, a pathologist, and seventy-seven other 
ranks, as well as seven professional nurses from the Queen Alexandra’s 
Imperial Military Nursing Service (QAIMNS). Under the influence of 
Consulting Surgeon Sir Anthony Bowlby, CCSs became nuclei ‘around 
which a larger surgical organization could be formed’.18 Working in pairs 
from late 1915, CCSs were able to offer forward treatment and care to 
men suffering from a variety of wounds, including shock, bleeding, lung 
wounds and soft-tissue injuries. For men with abdominal wounds, where 
movement dramatically increased the mortality rate, retention and care 
closer to the front line had an important impact on survival rates. Thus, 
the increased size of establishment and sophistication of surgery meant 
that more wounded men both needed to and could be retained for longer, 
rather than being rapidly evacuated to the base. As a consequence, despite 
the change of name from hospital to clearing station in 1915 to better 
reflect their role in the evacuation process, CCSs in fact developed into 
increasingly static sites of care, a fact which influenced their relationship 
with the landscapes in which they sat.
ManipuLaTing
The growing size and stasis of the CCS meant that the landscape increas-
ingly had to accommodate the unit rather than the unit altering to fit the 
landscape. This was in contrast to the stationary field hospital, the equiv-
alent unit from the Second Anglo-Boer War, which, as Frederick Treves 
noted in The Tale of a Field Hospital (1912), followed Headquarters, in 
the case of No. 4 Field Hospital from Chieveley to Spearman’s Farm and 
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back again. In Treves’ memoir, the landscape over which the hospital 
travelled, and the locations where it established itself, defined the expe-
riences of both travel and care.19 While this remained in many ways true 
for the more mobile medical establishment of the Field Ambulance dur-
ing the First World War, the existence and strategic centrality of the much 
larger CCS units brought about a change in the RAMC’s relationship 
with the landscape. While the mobility and flexible structure of the Field 
Ambulance, formed of three sections, each divided into a bearer and tent 
subsection, enabled, to some extent, the use of the extant landscape in the 
setting up of dressing stations, the RAMC increasingly found itself manip-
ulating the landscape to enable it to undertake its dual duties of evacuation 
and care, the imperatives which coalesced around the role of the CCS.
While RAPs were located in or very near the front line trenches, and 
dressing stations made flexible use of abandoned buildings and other 
existing features of the landscape, the location of most CCSs was defined 
by one of two specific landmarks, with ‘most being located at the junc-
tion of the collecting and evacuation zones, usually near a railway ter-
minus or the confluence of several roads from the front’.20 This type of 
location emphasised the role of the unit as a pivot point for the move-
ment of men along the line of evacuation, a role which required good 
transport links. While railheads were necessary, navigable roads were 
equally important, as they allowed men to be brought down from dress-
ing stations by ambulance wagon, and later ambulance car, as well as 
being transported on further down the line, either by the same method 
or via ambulance train or hospital barge. The quality of these roads was 
particularly important for the care of the wounded, with the jolting of 
poorly-sprung ambulances over badly-maintained roads often proving 
lethal to men at risk of haemorrhage.21
Thus, one of the jobs undertaken by men serving with the RAMC 
was that of construction. J. W. Upton, a private with the 137th Field 
Ambulance, was, on one occasion, detailed ‘up to the Regimental Aid 
Post which was practically in the line’, not to help care for the wounded 
there, but to ‘dig a place in a bank, to enable a Ford Ambulance car to 
take shelter whilst waiting for “cases”’.22 Norman Femor, serving near 
Albert, found himself undertaking ‘a different job for a time helping the 
Engineers dig a large Dugout with two Entrances. They dug and we car-
ried it all out’.23 The 2/1st London Field Ambulance similarly helped to 
build the dugout which served as ‘B’ section’s advanced dressing station 
in Hebuterne in May 1916.24
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It was not only roads and dugouts that RAMC servicemen were called 
upon to construct, however. Sites of caregiving along the lines of evac-
uation needed to both move and expand to meet the growing demands 
placed upon them. As a result, men such as Walter Bentham often 
found themselves undertaking fatigues such as ‘clearing all the wreck-
age and making a good entrance’ to an abandoned building which was 
to be the winter headquarters of No. 8 Field Ambulance at Hoograff in 
1915.25 On the Western Front, this sort of repurposing of abandoned 
or damaged structures, which offered some sort of protection against 
shellfire, was not only common but often creative. The bearers at the 
headquarters of the 2/1st London Field Ambulance, for instance, found 
themselves, during the Arras offensive, ‘located in a deep chalk cave at 
Wancourt, which certainly provided better shelter than the usually very 
temporary and unprotected bivouac, but the atmosphere of the cave 
was—well, to put it mildly—not particularly healthy’.26 Not all locations 
pre-existed, however. As we have seen, CCSs and other large hospital 
units could be formed of tents covering a large area of land and requir-
ing the installation of amenities such as pathways, incinerators and cook-
houses (Fig. 7.2).27
Fig. 7.2 General arrangement of No. 30 CCS, France, Wellcome Images, Wel l-
come Library, London, L0044173
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In Egypt, drainage was a necessity in an effort to combat mosqui-
toes.28 The comparatively sparse population outside the major conurba-
tions in this theatre meant that tented units were extremely common. As 
Pt. W. M. Lamb wrote of his time in Palestine, ‘Tent pitch and hard 
work [were often] the order of the day’.29 Where possible, the land-
scape, as in France, was utilised to protect static encampments. Thus, the 
dressing station that Lamb built on 14 April was ‘in a gully, or whadi as 
it is called here’.30 Later, he would find himself serving in a monastery 
near Jerusalem which had been turned into a hospital.31 Like the 2/1st 
London Field Ambulance and Bentham, Lamb both utilised and manip-
ulated the landscape in which he found himself. In Egypt and Palestine, 
as on the Western Front, the work of RAMC servicemen in static sites of 
caregiving was defined by the need of the units to adapt to the landscape 
as well as by the labour of shaping the landscape to suit the unit.
While this role as labourer may seem divorced from the medical 
imperatives of evacuation and care, it was nonetheless significant in struc-
turing RAMC rankers’ identities as servicemen. As Rob Thompson has 
argued, the work of the majority of British servicemen on the Western 
Front was that of the labourer rather than the soldier. The dominance 
of daily chores, known in the British military as fatigues, and working 
parties meant that the work of construction, which shaped many men’s 
civilian lives, was also a significant theme of their military experiences.32 
In undertaking such manual labour, RAMC servicemen like Upton and 
Femor were serving in exactly the same way as their combatant col-
leagues, without arms or killing, but in the service of the national mil-
itary endeavour. Such service, and the physical labour on which it was 
based, formed one way in which RAMC servicemen viewed their war 
work as an appropriately masculine form of service, equal to that of the 
combatant.
nEgoTiaTing
The equivalence of service between combatant and medical service men 
has also been identified in the shared experience of trauma that both 
encountered.33 Yet while Lamb wrote that during his time serving in the 
operating theatre in the monastery he ‘saw some dreadful sights’,34 that 
period of the campaign was, for him, dominated less by the emotional 
labour of medical care than by a routine of ‘putting up camps, receiv-
ing wounded then evacuating them by any transport available […] then 
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moving forward’.35 The war of movement that Lamb experienced might 
appear, on the face of it, very different from the stasis that has tended to 
define the war, particularly on the Western Front. Yet, as we have already 
seen, movement was central to the work of RAMC rankers on all fronts. 
The work of men like Upton in constructing roads and turning places 
was intended to ease the flow of traffic across the landscape. The pro-
cess of clearing the battlefield that this enabled was as important a mili-
tary priority as the movement of troops and supplies. Indeed, it was this 
process of moving wounded men which most clearly defined the RAMC 
ranker’s, and more particularly the stretcher bearer’s, relationship with 
the landscape. This relationship was, above all, one of negotiation.
The need for the stretcher bearer to negotiate landscapes in order 
to do his duty was acknowledged from the start of these men’s service. 
The syllabus laid out for training camps in the RAMC training manual 
included five hours of drill, exercises and lectures related to the removal 
of the sick and wounded from battlefield to base.36 As part of this drill 
men were to be ‘exercised in carrying the loaded stretcher over var-
ious obstacles, and taught the methods most suitable for the safe car-
riage of the patients’.37 Exercises were, therefore, to be carried out over 
‘rough ground’ with ‘special attention [… being] paid to the carriage 
of the stretcher so as to keep it level and avoid jolting or unnecessary 
swaying’.38 The Guide to Promotion for Non-Commissioned Officers and 
Men of the RAMC, a privately produced training manual which summa-
rised the information contained in the official training manual, included 
a seven-question interrogation of how a stretcher should be carried up 
and down hill, as well as over uneven ground, with emphasis placed on 
the fact that, ‘under all circumstances’ the stretcher should be carried in 
a horizontal position. This was to be achieved ‘by practising the carriage 
of stretchers over uneven ground until the bearers become trained and 
habituated to perform this duty with ease and dexterity and comfort to 
the patient’.39 The guide also contains a six-step description of how to 
carry a loaded stretcher across a ditch, with the emphasis again placed on 
maintaining the stretcher in as flat a horizontal position as possible under 
all circumstances.40
This, of course, wasn’t always possible, as stretcher bearers themselves 
recalled. C. Midwinter’s memoirs of the 32nd Field Ambulance noted 
that ‘carrying in the wounded on Gallipoli, under fire, was terribly hard 
work. The ground made the going very rough. Stretchers had to be low-
ered over ledges, steered through narrow paths and thorn bushes’.41  
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H. L. Chase’s history of the 2/1st London Field Ambulance describes 
the work of the bearer companies at Ypres in August 1917 as:
an almost overwhelming task [involving] carrying wounded through 
Sanctuary and Chateau Woods past the Hooge Crater and down the 
Menin Road, where they were met by the motor ambulances which 
relieved them of their loads and then sped away down the Menin Road 
[…] while the bearers returned to the regimental aid posts for more 
wounded. The carrying track was nothing more than a single line of duck-
boards winding its way along through a veritable sea of mud, and one 
false step might well have proved fatal, as was evident from the numbers 
of drowned men (and horses) who could at intervals be seen almost com-
pletely submerged in that dreadful swamp.42
George Swindell similarly recalled the effects of weather: ‘it was easy car-
rying wounded on a stretcher, on dry duck-boards, but when the rain 
had soaked them, and also washed some pieces of mud onto them, it was 
like trying to walk, [sic] the greasy pole’.43
Nor was it only wet that caused problems for stretcher bearers trying 
to negotiate the landscape. Swindell described one valley he had to travel 
through as covered with ‘earth [which] from the continual explosions, 
was like breadcrumbs. [… T]here were no dug-outs, or anything in it, 
the two sides of the valley, were just earth colour, not a bit of colour for 
hundreds of yards, the shell holes, linked, and over lapped, the whole 
length’.44 Such landscapes made the safe and comfortable transport of 
patients additionally challenging as a lack of landmarks was deeply prob-
lematic for men whose work required ‘walking backwards and forwards 
all day’.45 If they were acting as stages in a relay over long distances, they 
additionally needed to be able to accurately pinpoint where to meet the 
next company of bearers or the rendezvous with motor ambulances.
The visualisation of landscape was thus an important element to 
the process of medical evacuation. Stretcher bearers had to be able to 
identify and note ‘ground suitable for moving wounded to or over’,46 
while officers had to be able to evaluate landscapes in order to suc-
cessfully locate aid posts and dressing stations, as well as communicat-
ing these locations and landscapes to those who would need to traverse 
them. RAMC officer training included military as well as medical train-
ing, with lectures on ‘the working of the lines of communication, with 
special reference to the evacuation of the wounded, provision of hospi-
tals, etc., selection of routes for evacuation of sick and wounded, and the 
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general principles which regulate their choice’ and ‘map reading and sim-
ple field sketching […] the object in view being to enable an officer to 
reach a point indicated by reference to a map, to describe the proposed 
site of a hospital, etc., or to send in a rough sketch of such things as a 
dressing station, a hospital site, or a building with its surroundings and 
approaches, according to the accepted methods’.47 For both officers and 
men, therefore, the ability to evaluate and communicate the landscapes 
over which evacuation and within which treatment would occur were 
vital skills.
While the development of these skills in officers via staff train-
ing might suggest that these were general medical skills, the ability to 
evaluate and negotiate landscapes often developed into a specialist one 
over the course of the war. Delays in the evacuation of the wounded, 
caused by problems of negotiating landscapes, had significant conse-
quences both for individual wounded men and battlefield logistics.48 
Yet the shifting nature of the landscape defined the speed of the evacua-
tion process. Bearers used damaged buildings, groups of trees and even 
dead and rotting corpses as landmarks for their journeys. On the Western 
Front, as land was fought over and bombarded again and again, this inti-
mate landscape could alter on a daily, or even an hourly basis, affecting 
men’s ability to move through it successfully. Lost bearer units were not 
uncommon, delaying the speed with which a wounded man was col-
lected and transported successfully to a point where he could be treated, 
thereby affecting the ultimate success of such treatment.49 The bearers of 
the 6th London Field Ambulance ‘[r]egularly […] lost our way [on the 
Somme], the one and only landmark being High Wood […]. I recall one 
journey when my squad toiled for seven solid hours carrying one case 
from the aid-post near Eaucourt to High Alley’.50
If the problems of negotiating landscapes for RAMC servicemen on 
the Western Front were defined primarily by rain and damage, those in 
Egypt were similarly shaped by sand and distance. The slipperiness of 
muddy duckboards was nothing compared to the difficulties of  walking 
through sand with a wounded man as a burden. W. D. Fothergill recalled, 
‘during our trek across the Sinae Desert […] being issued with snow 
shoes as an experiment to see if we could make better progress in the 
sand—we didn’t. We also had sledges drawn by mules to carry the sick 
and wounded but eventually got Model T Ford ambulances which ran 
on “roads” made by laying down ordinary rabbit netting on top of the 
sand—it worked’.51 Charles Ammons also recalled the invention of the 
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‘wire road’ ‘[t]o ease the movement of vehicles, animals and men in the 
loose sands […]. This consisted of mesh chicken wire pegged down at 
the edges and it fulfilled its purpose admirably of keeping wheels and feet 
on the surface’.52 Even so, officers such as W. Brown and R. C. Evans 
spent a great deal of time experimenting with alternative forms of trans-
portation to enable greater ease of evacuating the wounded, including 
a variety of sleighs and wheeled stretchers, mainly to replace the camel 
cacolets, detested for their lack of comfort or convenience and their ten-
dency, like the pavé roads of France, to cause further pain and injury to 
patients transported in them.53 Visual negotiation also linked RAMC 
servicemen’s relationships to the landscapes of Egypt and the Western 
Front. While shelling constantly altered the visual landscape of France 
and Flanders, making negotiation difficult for stretcher bearers, the fea-
turelessness of the desert had a similar effect in Egypt. The dangers of 
bearers becoming lost in the landscape were just as great.
In the face of these problems, RAMC stretcher bearers took great 
pride in their ability to successfully negotiate the landscape during long 
carries. Swindell recalled numerous cases of men who thanked him for 
his work in carrying them down, including one man who was:
fifteen stone, some odd pounds, in his skin, and all his clothes muddy, and 
wet, My he was a weight, turn and turn about we carried him, the fur-
ther we went in the slithering mud, the heavier he seemed to get, […] we 
arrived down at last, he was in a bad way, well thanks mates, the chaps up 
the line don’t half call you some names, I did too, but I didn’t know what 
you had to do, and I withdraw now all I ever said.54
Swindell’s response to another man who wanted to give him something 
in return for his labour was ‘we don’t do our job for that, we do it as our 
share of this job’.55 As with the labour of manipulating the landscape, 
the effort of negotiating it enabled RAMC servicemen to construct 
themselves as comrades in service despite the fact that the nature of their 
service meant that they could not be seen as comrades in arms.
concLusion
RAMC servicemen of the First World War served within a variety of 
landscapes which shaped the nature of the work they undertook. In 
all these landscapes, however, their work was underpinned by the dual 
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priorities of military medical care, to heal the wounded in order to 
return them to service and to evacuate the battlefield of wounded to 
facilitate combat. These two potentially conflicting imperatives of stasis 
and movement meant that medical servicemen’s relationships with the 
landscape were defined by their need to manipulate it and negotiate it. 
Hospitals where care could be undertaken had to be placed within a 
landscape which then needed to adapt to the requirements of these sites 
to expand. The road and rail networks, along which these hospitals were 
placed, had to be created and maintained to enable the movement of 
men along the line of evacuation. However, this movement often had 
to adapt to the landscape, as medical servicemen learned to negotiate 
mud, sand, ditches and distance without getting lost in order to evacuate 
their patients.
The labour involved in both manipulation and negotiation was often 
intense and, for many RAMC servicemen, memorable. Importantly, it 
enabled them to define themselves as inhabiting appropriately masculine 
service identities in wartime. The building of hospitals and roads was the 
equivalent of the manual labour of combatant working parties, while the 
effort of carrying a wounded man under fire was an alternative form of 
effortful, even self-sacrificial, service in time of war. The landscapes of war 
thus shaped not only the roles but also the identities of RAMC servicemen 
in wartime. Given the centrality of landscape to both the work and char-
acter of medical service provision in the British military during the First 
World War, it is little wonder that landscape should form such a significant 
element of the records left by these men. It was, for many, the landscape 
which turned them from ‘poultice wallahs’ into comrades in service.
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